



**INTERNET  
SECURITY  
ALLIANCE**

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# Our Partners





# *Industry Affairs/Government Relations*





## Business Services

- Integrating Information Security into the Business Plan (NASDAQ Conference)
- ISAlliance Integrated Security Services Program
  - E-Discovery
  - Outsourcing Risk Management
  - Security Breach Notification
  - Security Incident Handling
  - Auditing
- High Profile Speaking and Article Placements
- Preventing and Detecting Insider Threats
- Best Practices Development
  - Senior Managers Guide to Cyber Security
  - Small Businesses Guide to Cyber Security
  - Home Users & Mobile Executive Guide
- Cyber Insurance Discount Program for Best Practice Compliance (up to 15%)
- Exclusive Annual Privacy Policy Trends Report
- Contracting for Information Security, Model Commercial Agreements Guides
- IT Risk Management Quarterly Work Group

## Technical Services


- Weekly Webinars from Carnegie Mellon University on Emerging Info Security issues
- Continuing Education Credit Program in Information Security
- ISAlliance/ANSI Model Terms for Certified ISMS featuring ISO/IEC 27001
- ISAlliance/ANSI Model Commercial Agreements featuring ISO/IEC 17799
- ISAlliance/ISSA Guide to Model Terms for Commercial Agreements
- SQUARE Methodology and Tool
- Online Assessment Tools and Insurance Discounts
- Exclusive Annual Software Assurance Report
- Participation in Critical Infrastructure Protection Planning with U.S. DHS
- Placement of Membership Articles in Professional Journals
  - Fixing Cyber Security Problems
- Daily Threat and Vulnerability Briefings from US-CERT

## Legal & Policy Services

- Comprehensive Solutions for E-Discovery
- Interaction with Senior Policy Makers
  - Congress
  - Department of Homeland Security
  - US Department of Commerce Economic Security Working Group
- National Infrastructure Protection Plan
  - IT Sector Coordinating Council
- Member Speaking & Writing Opportunities
  - Cutter IT Journal
- Market Incentives for Cyber Security
  - Market Incentives White Paper
- Congressional Staff Briefings
  - Defense Issues
  - IT & Telecommunications Issues
  - Insider Threats
  - International Issues
- Exclusive Annual Privacy Policy Trends Report
- Privacy Quarterly Work Group

# The Old Web


ARPANET GEOGRAPHIC MAP, OCTOBER 1980



(NOTE: THIS MAP DOES NOT SHOW ARPA'S EXPERIMENTAL SATELLITE CONNECTIONS)  
 NAMES SHOWN ARE IMP NAMES, NOT (NECESSARILY) HOST NAMES



# The Web Today



Source: <http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ches/map/gallery/index.html>



# *The Changing Threat*

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A fast-moving virus or worm pandemic is not the threat it was...



2002-2004 almost **100** medium-to-high risk attacks (“Slammer”; “SoBig”).

2005, there were only **6**

2006 and 2007..... **Zero**



# *Faces of Attackers... Then*

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Joseph McElroy

*Hacked US Dept of Energy*



Jeffrey Lee Parson

*Blaster-B Copycat*



Chen-Ing Hau

*CIH Virus*



# *Faces of Attackers... Now*

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Jay Echouafni  
*Competitive DDoS*



Jeremy Jaynes  
*\$24M SPAM KING*



Andrew Schwarmkoff  
*Russian Mob Phisher*



# *The Changing Threat*

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Today, attackers perpetrate *fraud*, gather *intelligence*, or conduct *blackmail*

Vulnerabilities are on client-side applications word, spreadsheets, printers, etc.

“The future threat landscape around the world will be dictated by the soon-to-be-released Apple iPhone, Internet telephony and Internet video-sharing, and other Web-based innovations” (McAfee 2007)



# *The Threat Landscape is Changing*



## **Early Attacks**

**Who:** Kids, researchers, hackers, isolated criminals

**Why:** Seeking fame & glory, use widespread attacks for maximum publicity

**Risk Exposure:** Downtime, business disruption, information loss, defacement

## **New Era Attacks**


Organized criminals, corporate spies, disgruntled employees, terrorists

Seeking profits, revenge, use targeted stealth attacks to avoid detection

Direct financial loss via theft and/or embezzlement, breach disclosure, IP compromised, business disruption, infrastructure failure



# *The Threat Landscape is Changing*



## **Early Attacks**

**Defense:** Reactive AV signatures

**Recovery:** Scan & remove

**Type:** Virus, worm, spyware

## **New Era Attacks**

Multilayer pre-emptive and behavioral systems

System wide, sometimes impossible without re-image of system

Targeted malware, root kits, spear phishing, ransomware, denial of service, back door taps, Trojans, IW

## *Characteristics of the New Attackers*

Shift to profit motive

Zero day exploits

Increased investment and innovation in  
malcode

Increased use of stealth techniques





# *Digital Growth?*     **Sure**

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“Companies have built into their business models the efficiencies of digital technologies such as real time tracking of supply lines, inventory management and on-line commerce. The continued expansion of the digital lifestyle is already built into almost every company’s assumptions for growth.”

*---Stanford University Study, July 2006*



# *Digital Defense?* Maybe Not

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29% of Senior Executives “acknowledged” that they did not know how many negative security events they had in the past year

50% of Senior Executives said they did not know how much money was lost due to attacks



*Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 7,000 companies 9/06*



# Digital Defense

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## Not So Much

23% of CTOs did not know if cyber losses were covered by insurance.

34% of CTOs thought cyber losses would be covered by insurance----and were wrong.

“The biggest network vulnerability in American corporations are extra connections added for senior executives without proper security.”

---Source: DHS Chief Economist Scott Borg



# *Problem Summary*

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Big, Growing, Scary (micro and macro economic impacts, real national security issues, physical danger)

Threats are constantly evolving (from love bug to designer malware, and worse)

Bad actors, and their motives are changing (not HS kids showing off it's Organized Crime, Nation states and terrorists seeking money & power)

There really is no coherent agreed upon program (current public-private partnership is good idea, but ill-defined, not properly balanced and not adequately supported)



# *What We need*

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Coherent sustainable system

Multi-faceted

Broad based

Capable of evolving quickly



# *Private Sector Schizophrenia*

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The private sector has largely embraced the upsides of digitalization (inventory management/on line sales etc.)

Much of the private sector has ignored the downsides of digitalization (e.g. sustained cyber security investment)

The key to success is driving the private sector to WANT to provide internet security

The core problem is that security is viewed as a cost center



# *Will the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (19<sup>th</sup>) Model of regulation work?*

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Too narrow jurisdiction (must be world wide)

Regulation is good for minimum standards when we need increasingly higher standards

Too slow (not even counting court review)

Too inflexible (must keep pace with threats)

Subject to political dumbing down (e.g. campaign finance regulation)



# *Old Regulatory could be counter Productive*

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Could slow tech progress, the prime driver of US economy

Could drive business to “safe’ havens overseas creating not only monetary loss for US but less US tech control and thus less security

Could create false sense of security



# *We Need a New social Contract*

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E.g. 20th century social contract between telephone companies and government.

Phone companies agreed to provide universal service at regulated rates.

Government provided monopoly franchise and “guaranteed” rate of return on private investment

It worked well (if not perfectly) for nearly a century



# *Why Private Industry is better than Gov for this task*

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Industry owns, operates and creates most of the system

Industry can act much more quickly than government

Industry can upgrade security in information systems across nation state borders.

Industry can enforce expanded security through contracts and other business practices

Industry is less prone to political pressures to water down standards

The key is return on investment



# *Gov. New Modern Role*

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A. Serve as a model---get their house in order

B. Regulation can provide incentive for regulated domestic industries

Develop market incentives to bring in non-regulated sectors and multi-national players (patriotism and education are not enough)

Coordinate and streamline among and between jurisdictions (eliminating unnecessary costs)

Address issues beyond the corporate reach (e.g. R&D on developing truly secure I-net protocols)



# *The “What” to be Encouraged*

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Good news: We actually know a good deal about providing cyber security

There are multiple agencies producing best practices, standards and technologies---often Gov and PS together

Research demonstrates that following these practices can be effective in managing risk and reducing harm



# *The Why/How: Market Incentives*

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Procurement---not just cost but security---really

Civil liability reform---a Cyber Safety Act

Tax breaks---- for small business only

Insurance

Stafford Act relief

Streamlined compliance relief

Anti-trust relief allowing partnerships like SemaTech

Awards program



# *Moving in the right Direction/ ISA Programs*

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- Apply the SAFETY Act to Cyber Security
- How to secure the Global IT supply chain
- How to secure the VOIP Platform
- Developing a Framework for Corporations to assess, manage and transfer cyber risks



# *Applying the SAFETY Act*

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- SAFETY Act Passed following 9/11 to encourage the development of anti-terrorism technologies
- Insurance benefits, liability protection, marketing benefits
- Initially difficult for Corporations to manage and focused on high value physical threats
- New focus on cyber including an expanded concept of threat and terrorism
- ISA providing aid to companies to get SAFETY



# *Securing the Global IT Supply Chain*

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- IT supply chain is inherently global
- This immutable reality brings new risks
- If not addressed Congress will do it for us, probably through protectionism
- Bad for everyone
- ISA/CMU/industry 3-phase program to analyze the situation and create a solution that takes into account market, business and policy reality



# *Securing the VOIP Platform*

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- VOIP is the paradigm case for corporate economics overcoming security concerns
- Platform itself not a profitable as products sold to use it
- ISA/NIST program to use SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) and National Vulnerability Database to create a free customizable framework -- better market security products.
- Better security and better markets



# *Develop a Framework for Corporate Cyber Risk*

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- Grows out of 911 legislation passed in 2007
- Bring cyber risk analysis to all relevant areas of corporate culture (not just IT)
- Develop a tool allowing for more standardized internal analysis and action
- Include legal/regulatory/ compliance/operations/ insurance/governance external communications



# *Summary*

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- Internet unlike anything before, must be managed in a new way
- Sustainable security is possible only if owners and operators want to make it happen
- New ways for industry and government to look at problems must be tried
- We actually can do a lot
- Cost must be an inherent consideration